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The integration of information has been considered a hallmark of human consciousness, as it 2 
requires information being globally available via widespread neural interactions. Yet, the 3 
complex interdependencies between multisensory integration and perceptual awareness, or 4 
consciousness, remain to be defined. While perceptual awareness has traditionally been 5 
studied in a single sense, in recent years we have witnessed a surge of interest in the role of 6 
multisensory integration in perceptual awareness.  7 
Based on a recent IMRF symposium on multisensory awareness, this review discusses three 8 
key questions from conceptual, methodological and experimental perspectives:  9 
1. What do we study when we study multisensory awareness?  10 
2. What is the relationship between multisensory integration and perceptual awareness?  11 
3. Which experimental approaches are most promising to characterize multisensory 12 
awareness? 13 
We hope that this review paper will provoke lively discussions, novel experiments, and 14 
conceptual considerations to advance our understanding of the multifaceted interplay between 15 








In our everyday lives, our brain has to deal with a constant influx of sensory signals. Looking 2 
at perceptual experience though, a fundamental aspect of our conscious awareness is that 3 
sensory signals are integrated nearly effortlessly into a seamless multisensory perception of 4 
our environment. Yet, even though multisensory experience is pervasive in everyday life, the 5 
relationship between multisensory integration and perceptual awareness remains unclear. 6 
This lack of clarity is all the more surprising given that several leading theories see a strong 7 
link between information integration and perceptual awareness. For instance, according to the 8 
global workspace model, consciousness emerges when information is made globally 9 
available via long-range connectivity such as the fronto-parietal system (Dehaene 2001). 10 
Other theories suggest that consciousness emerges via recurrent interactions that enable 11 
information exchange across multiple levels of the cortical hierarchy (Lamme 2006; Lamme 12 
& Roelfsema 2000). Finally, the integrated information theory of consciousness associates 13 
consciousness with ‘integrated information’ and aims to determine the structural and 14 
functional properties that enable neural systems to form complex integrated information as a 15 
prerequisite of consciousness (Balduzzi & Tononi 2008). 16 
Yet, despite the proposed link between information integration and consciousness, perceptual 17 
awareness has traditionally been studied in terms of single-sense experiences (see De Graaf et 18 
al. 2012; Dehaene & Changeux 2011 for reviews), such as vision, audition (Allen et al. 2000; 19 
Bekinschtein et al. 2009; Giani et al. 2015; Gutschalk et al. 2008; Haynes et al. 2005; Ro et 20 
al. 2003), or, on occasion, touch (Gallace & Spence 2008; Gallace & Spence 2014) or 21 
olfaction (Stevenson & Attuquayefio 2013). Only in recent years have we witnessed a surge 22 
of interest in studying perceptual awareness in multisensory terms. Based on a recent IMRF 23 
symposium on the topic, this paper aims to review the key conceptual, methodological and 24 
empirical findings that have advanced the field in recent years, and to provide better tools to 25 
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confront the challenges raised by the multifaceted interplay between multisensory integration 1 
and perceptual awareness. 2 
Section 1 provides a conceptual map of the kind of phenomena which fall under the general 3 
label of ‘multisensory awareness’, and highlights the main challenge for the field.  We 4 
discuss the commonalities and differences of perceptual awareness that may occur in 5 
unisensory and multisensory contexts.  For instance, in vision, information needs to be 6 
integrated across time and space into a coherent percept of our dynamic environment. Vision 7 
also faces the challenge of binding features such as colour and form, which are represented 8 
predominantly in different brain areas, into a unified object percept (Ghose & Maunsell 1999; 9 
Roskies 1999; Wolfe & Cave 1999). Along similar lines, multisensory perception relies on 10 
binding complementary pieces of information (e.g. an object’s shape from the front side via 11 
vision and from the rear via touch) that are provided by different sensory modalities. 12 
Moreover, different senses can provide redundant information about specific properties such 13 
as the spatial location or timing of an event.  14 
Section 2 explores the relationship between multisensory integration and multisensory 15 
awareness. More specifically, it reviews the behavioural and neural research investigating the 16 
extent to which multisensory signals can be integrated in the absence of awareness. 17 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that signals that we are aware of in one sensory 18 
modality can boost signals from another sensory modality that we are not aware of into 19 
perceptual awareness depending on temporal coincidence, spatial or higher order 20 
correspondences such as semantic or phonological congruency (Adam & Noppeney 2014; 21 
Aller et al. 2015; Alsius & Munhall 2013; Chen & Spence 2011a; Chen & Spence 2011b; 22 
Hsiao et al. 2012; Olivers & Van der Burg 2008; Palmer & Ramsey 2012). Less is known 23 
about whether signals that we are unaware of can also influence where and how we perceive 24 
signals that we are aware of. Moreover, despite the vast neurophysiological evidence showing 25 
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multisensory interactions in anaesthetized animals (Stein & Meredith 1993) only little 1 
behavioural evidence has been accumulated indicating that two signals from different sensory 2 
modalities can interact in the absence of awareness such as sleep (Arzi et al. 2012) or when 3 
signals are masked and thus precluded from awareness in both sensory modalities (Faivre et 4 
al. 2014). 5 
Finally, Section 3 discusses the various experimental approaches that can be pursued to tap 6 
into multisensory awareness. Unisensory research has developed a large repertoire of 7 
experimental manipulations and paradigms to contrast sensory processing in the presence and 8 
absence of awareness including multistable perception (e.g., ambiguous figures, multistable 9 
motion quartets, binocular rivalry, and continuous flash suppression), attentional blink, 10 
masking, or sleep. Which of those experimental approaches might be most promising when it 11 
comes to multisensory awareness?  12 
 13 
Section 1: What do we study when we study multisensory awareness? 14 
Most of our conscious experiences occur in a multisensory setting when several sensory 15 
modalities are likely being stimulated simultaneously. Some senses, like the vestibular 16 
system, proprioception, or touch, indeed almost never ‘switch off’ in natural circumstances. 17 
Meanwhile, audition and vision often function together starting with saccadic coordination 18 
(Heffner & Heffner 1992a, b; Kruger et al. 2014) and leading to many well-known audio-19 
visual illusions, such as the spatial ventriloquist effect (Alais & Burr 2004; Bertelson & 20 
Aschersleben 1998; Vroomen & de Gelder 2004), the McGurk effect (McGurk & MacDonald 21 
1976), the double-flash fission or fusion illusion (Andersen et al. 2004; Shams et al. 2000), 22 
and pitch-induced illusory motion (Maeda et al. 2004). 23 
Most phenomenological reports also tell us that conscious experiences are multisensory: We 24 
perceive talking faces, we go through scented and colourful gardens, filled with birdsong, we 25 
sense the noise and feel of the computer keys pressed under our fingers. The evidence, then, 26 
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converges in making consciousness a matter of multisensory combination. This raises an 1 
important question: How should we map the concept of multisensory integration with the 2 
first-person evidence of unified perceptual awareness? It is important to note that integration 3 
is studied as a process, or rather a set of processes, while consciousness is often analysed as a 4 
state presenting us with objects, events, and their relations. With consciousness being one of 5 
the most discussed and controversial notion in the philosophical and scientific literature, we 6 
only attempt here to provide a useful taxonomy to distinguish between different cases of 7 
multisensory awareness, for the field to study. With these distinctions in hand, it is useful to 8 
look at what the study of awareness really involves, by drawing on two useful conceptual 9 
distinctions between access and content.  10 
 11 
Three kinds of multisensory contents 12 
 While the field is most concerned with cases where a single property is perceived through 13 
two or more sensory modalities, there is more to multisensory awareness than these. The 14 
most studied cases concern those situations where different senses provide redundant 15 
information about specific properties such as the spatial location or timing of an event. 16 
Imagine, for instance, running through the forest and spotting a robin sitting on the branch 17 
and singing (Rohe & Noppeney 2015, 2016). By integrating redundant spatial information 18 
from vision and audition, the brain can form more reliable estimates of the location of the 19 
singing bird. Redundant information can even be provided about higher-order aspects such as 20 
a phoneme, as in speech perception. In fact, perceptual illusions such as spatial ventriloquism 21 
(Alais & Burr 2004; Bertelson & Aschersleben 1998; Vroomen & de Gelder 2004) or the 22 
McGurk illusion (Gau & Noppeney 2016; McGurk & MacDonald 1976; Munhall et al. 1996) 23 
emerge because different sensory modalities provide redundant, yet slightly conflicting 24 
information about the spatial location or a particular phoneme (e.g., [ba] vs. [ga]). Another 25 
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good illustration can be when touch and vision contribute to the perception of shape (Ernst & 1 
Banks 2002). This said, the integration of redundant information is not necessarily tied to 2 
multisensory awareness, and could lead to episodes of unisensory consciousness being biased 3 
by the information provided by another modality, be it consciously perceived or not. In other 4 
words, many of these cases could be cases of crossmodal bias of unisensory awareness, as 5 
much as genuine cases of unified multisensory awareness. A possible way to exclude the first 6 
possibility is to show that the integration of two sensory inputs leads to the conscious 7 
experience of a new property or aspect which could not be experienced by a conjunction of 8 
unisensory episodes. This could consist in being able to experience the simultaneity between 9 
two unisensory events, or in the emergence of a new quality, such as  flavour, which is 10 
commonly taken to involve a fusion of taste, smell (retronasal olfactory), and trigeminal 11 
inputs (Spence et al. 2015). In other words, we should not be too fast in thinking that all cases 12 
of integration need to get manifested in episodes of multisensory awareness and should look 13 
for evidence of specific or emerging multisensory properties (see Partan & Marler 1999). 14 
At least two other kinds of cases also need to be considered when studying multisensory 15 
awareness, besides cases resting on the integration of redundant information.  16 
 On the one hand, two modalities can contribute to the perception of the same object, but 17 
different or complementary properties of that object. These are the classical cases of 18 
multisensory binding- cases where one is conscious of the visual shape of the dog and the 19 
sound of its bark (Chen & Spence 2010), the shape of the kettle and the whistling sound 20 
(Jackson 1953). The two unisensory components need to be referred to the same object, or at 21 
least, in the case of an event, to the same moment and perceived location.  These cases form a 22 
distinct category of conscious perception of multisensory objects and events, and raise 23 
different challenges than the one where the contents experienced by two modalities are the 24 
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same. Here the two contents can remain unisensory but multisensory awareness seems to be 1 
of their co-attribution to the same object (or space/time). 2 
On the other hand, cases where different senses contribute to the perception of one and the 3 
same property, or object, should not make us forget about a third, and no less important, 4 
category where two objects in different modalities, or even two multisensory objects, are 5 
experienced as part of the same multisensory scene. For instance, you may be aware of the 6 
cup in front of you, while also being conscious of the shape and temperature of the spoon in 7 
your hand, and the sounds of the barista talking behind you. All these various unisensory and 8 
multisensory objects or events are different and yet they are all experienced as part of the 9 
same setting or scene - presenting us with a third kind of multisensory awareness, i.e. 10 
multisensory scene perception1.  11 
 12 
Multisensory contents vs. multisensory access 13 
With these distinctions in hand, we can now turn to another important conceptual difference 14 
between what people report and what they are phenomenally aware of, or what they attend to. 15 
While there is no doubt that people will report experiencing multisensory objects, for 16 
instance, or scenes, the question that cognitive neuroscientists need to ask is whether these 17 
correspond to what is present in consciousness at any given time, or what is reconstructed 18 
through other processes aggregating information experienced at different times. If this 19 
crucially marks the difference between genuine multisensory awareness and other processes 20 
where conscious information can be coalesced, the difference is certainly easier to draw 21 
conceptually than experimentally. Spence & Bayne 2015, for instance, question whether 22 
reports of multisensory events or objects should be taken at face value for being about a 23 
unified conscious episode, and whether they do not perhaps hide a rapid switch of attention 24 
1 This aspect is seldom approached in the experimental literature, and more often discussed in the philosophical 
literature as a form of ‘phenomenal unity’. See Deroy (2014) for review and discussion.  
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between unisensory conscious episodes. The co-attribution to a single object would then not 1 
depend on the awareness of a multisensory object but on something like an ‘attentional glue’. 2 
In the absence of a good model for how attention could perform this role, it might be 3 
sufficient to note that the co-attribution to a single object might be a matter of non-conscious 4 
representation, which keeps track of, and predicts a relation of co-occurrence and co-5 
localisation between two properties (Deroy 2014). In other words, researchers interested in 6 
the link between multisensory integration and awareness should not take for granted that the 7 
kind of contents described above and reported by participants require multisensory access 8 
(see Table 1). Room should be left to explore how contents and access could come apart. 9 
While there is good evidence that we keep track of multisensory contents, a key question is to 10 
know whether those get manifested in consciousness or sit outside awareness. A second key 11 
question will be to see whether the same process or analysis should be given for all these 12 
cases. Integrating redundant information across the senses on the assumption that they 13 
concern a single property, or having to determine whether two kinds of information need to 14 
be referred to the same object, or how objects then relate to one another in a scene are 15 
different processes; It is likely that each will require to be investigated separately when it 16 
comes to its dependence on, and manifestation in, consciousness.  17 












referred to the 
same object  
Co-presence of 
multiple objects 
in the same 
scene 






Access Being aware of a 
single property 
across different 
senses at the 
same time 
Being aware that 
two unisensory 
properties belong 
to the same object 
or are part of a 
single event 
Being aware that 
two unisensory or 
multisensory 
objects are present 
at the same time in 
the environment  
 2 
Table 1: Overview of the three kinds of cases falling under the heading of multisensory awareness. 3 
Evidence of multisensory access is different from evidence that our brains and minds are integrating 4 
information about properties, objects and scenes, as these contents could be the result of unconscious 5 
processes, and not experienced at once.   6 
 7 
Section 2: What is the relationship between multisensory integration and awareness?  8 
One of the key functions of the human brain is to monitor bodily states (interoception) and 9 
environmental states (exteroception) (Blanke 2012; Critchley & Harrison 2013; Faivre et al. 10 
2015). Despite the tremendous amount and variability of exteroceptive and interoceptive 11 
signals the brain has to process, such monitoring seems to be performed flawlessly, and one 12 
experiences being an integrated bodily-self, evolving in a unified, multisensory world (i.e., 13 
phenomenal unity, Chalmers & Bayne, 2003). Intuitively, perceptual consciousness, (i.e., the 14 
subjective experiences caused by a subset of perceptual processes), may be better 15 
characterized as multisensory by essence, reflecting multisensory wholes rather than sums of 16 
unisensory features. In this respect, it is important to distinguish situations in which percepts 17 
from different modalities merely coexist (e.g., reading while scratching my hand), with 18 
10 
 
situations in which they merge into a single unitary experience (e.g., looking at my hand 1 
being scratched; Deroy et al. 2014). Many theories of perceptual consciousness postulate 2 
strong interdependencies between consciousness and the capacity to integrate information 3 
across the senses, but also across spatial, temporal, and semantic dimensions (Mudrik et al. 4 
2014). Accordingly, when consciously processing signals of multiple sensory origins, one 5 
may have privileged access to the integrated product while losing access to its component 6 
parts, and therefore experience phenomenal unity. Exploring the properties of phenomenal 7 
unity empirically is  challenging, considering the nonspecific nature of subjective report 8 
(“Did you experience a multisensory object or two unisensory features?”), but also the 9 
discrepancy between phenomenal experience and multisensory integration as measured at the 10 
neural level (Deroy et al. 2014). Initial evidence has shown that participants do not integrate 11 
signals from vision and haptics into perceptual metamers, but were still able to distinguish 12 
between perceptual estimates based on congruent and incongruent signals (Hillis et al. 2002). 13 
These results suggest that participants had at least to some extent access to the sensory 14 
component signals rather than one unified multisensory estimate. 15 
At the behavioural level, it has been repeatedly shown that the processing of an invisible 16 
stimulus is affected by the processing of supraliminal stimuli in the auditory, tactile, 17 
proprioceptive, vestibular, or olfactory modalities (see below for details). Yet because in 18 
these studies participants were always conscious of the non-visual stimulus, these results 19 
could well reflect the interplay between unconscious vision and conscious processes in 20 
another modality, rather than an integrative process between two unconscious 21 
representations. Information about the supraliminal stimulus is possibly broadcast throughout 22 
the brain, and modulates visual neurons activated by the invisible stimulus.  23 
Thus, these results are compatible with the view that multisensory integration requires 24 
consciousness, but we will now see that other studies in which no stimulus is consciously 25 
11 
 
perceived are more decisive. In one of them (Arzi et al. 2012), it was shown that associations 1 
between tones and odours occurred during NREM sleep, arguably in the complete absence of 2 
awareness. The authors relied on partial-reinforcement trace conditioning, and measured sniff 3 
responses to tones previously paired with pleasant and unpleasant odours while participants 4 
were sleeping. Even though subjects were in NREM sleep stage, and arguably unconscious, 5 
they sniffed in response to tones alone, suggesting that they learned novel multimodal 6 
associations unconsciously. However, controlling stimulus awareness during sleep is 7 
difficult, and the possibility remains that the stimuli were consciously accessed when 8 
presented, but forgotten by the time of awaking. In another study trying to account for this 9 
potential limitation, awake participants were shown to compare the numerical information 10 
conveyed by an invisible image and an inaudible sound (Faivre et al. 2014). Interestingly, 11 
such unconscious audiovisual comparisons only occurred in those cases where the 12 
participants had previously been trained with consciously perceived stimuli, thus suggesting 13 
that conscious but not unconscious training enabled subsequent unconscious processes. The 14 
level at which the comparison of written and spoken digits operates is still an open question. 15 
While it could involve multisensory analyses of low-level visual and acoustic features, a 16 
possibility remains that the comparison is made independently of perceptual features, once 17 
the visual and auditory stimuli have separately reached an amodal, semantic representation. 18 
Moreover, multisensory comparisons (e.g., congruency judgments) do not necessarily imply 19 
multisensory integration. Future studies may potentially help in disentangling these various 20 
mechanisms (Noel et al. 2015). First, disrupting the spatiotemporal structure of the 21 
audiovisual stream should have a larger impact on the comparative process in the case that it 22 
operates at a perceptual, rather than semantic, non-perceptual level. Second, in case the 23 
results rely on multisensory interactions in the absence of awareness, weakening the visual 24 
and auditory signals may potentially increase the strength of their integrated product, by 25 
12 
 
virtue of audiovisual inverse effectiveness (Stanford 2005; Stein et al. 2009; von Saldern & 1 
Noppeney 2013). Third, if two subliminal signals are indeed integrated into a unified percept 2 
rather than only compared, the integrated percept should be able to prime subsequent 3 
perceptual processing.  4 
At the neural level, several mechanisms support the possibility of unconscious multisensory 5 
integration. First, unconscious multisensory integration may be enabled by multisensory 6 
neurons that that do not take part in large-scale interactions. While such neurons have been 7 
described at relatively low-levels in the brain, including primary sensory (Ghazanfar & 8 
Schroeder 2006; Kayser et al. 2010; Lee & Noppeney 2014; Lee & Noppeney 2011; Liang et 9 
al. 2013; Meyer et al. 2010; Rohe & Noppeney 2016; Vetter et al. 2014; Werner & Noppeney 10 
2010a) and subcortical structures like the superior colliculus (see Meredith & Stein 1986; 11 
Stein & Stanford 2008, for a review), their relevance for elaborate cognitive functions 12 
remains to be assessed. Second, and higher in the neural hierarchy, another possibility is that 13 
unconscious multisensory integration operates through feedforward connections (and most 14 
likely outside of awareness, see Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000) between sensory cortical areas 15 
and multisensory convergence zones such as the superior temporal sulcus or the posterior 16 
parietal cortex (Schroeder & Foxe 2005; Werner & Noppeney 2010b). Interestingly, such 17 
feedforward processes within low-level cortices and at early post-stimulus latencies have 18 
been shown to affect multisensory information processing and behaviour despite stimulus 19 
unawareness (e.g., phosphene perception enhancement by unconscious looming sounds, 20 
Romei et al. 2009). In contrast with these mechanisms, multisensory integration is sometimes 21 
held to require long-range feedback connections between sensory cortices and frontoparietal 22 
networks, a mechanism that typically coincides with conscious access (Dehaene & Changeux 23 
2011). Hence, disentangling bottom-up and top-down multisensory processes is likely to be 24 
13 
 
an important step towards understanding the intricate links between multisensory integration 1 
and consciousness (De Meo et al. 2015). 2 
 3 
Section 3: Which experimental approaches are most promising to characterize 4 
multisensory awareness? 5 
Over the past decade, a growing number of studies have focused on the emergence of 6 
perceptual awareness in multisensory contexts. The majority of those studies have 7 
investigated how a signal arising from another sensory modality can modulate the access to 8 
visual awareness by using experimental paradigms in which visual stimuli, albeit presented 9 
on the retina, are suppressed from visual awareness using a variety of experimental 10 
paradigms such as attentional blink, masking, and multistable perception. Here we will focus 11 
on experimental approaches using bistable visual stimuli (Blake & Logothetis 2002) to 12 
investigate multisensory interactions during different states of visual awareness. 13 
 14 
Bistable perception of ambiguous figures 15 
 Our visual system is often faced with perceptual ambiguity and perceptual decisions need to 16 
be made to efficiently interact with the external world. According to the Bayesian theory of 17 
perception (for review see Knill & Pouget 2004), the brain deals with perceptual uncertainty 18 
and ambiguity by representing sensory information in the form of probability distributions. If 19 
different perceptual interpretations have the same likelihood and are mutually exclusive, the 20 
visual system cannot “decide” in favour of one or the other and visual perception 21 
continuously oscillates between the two alternatives, a phenomenon called bistable 22 
perception (Dayan 1998). Bistable perception is thought to be generated by the competition 23 
between neural populations representing different interpretations of a visual stimulus (Blake 24 
14 
 
& Logothetis 2002). Perceptual bistability can arise from different forms of ambiguity: 1 
ambiguity in depth (e.g., the Necker cube, Necker, 1832), ambiguity in figure-ground 2 
segregation (e.g. Rubing's face-vase illusion, Rubin, 1915), ambiguity between high-level 3 
interpretations of images (e.g., Boring's young girl/old woman figure, Boring, 1930), 4 
ambiguity in the direction of motion (e.g., the kinetic depth effect, Doner et al. 1984). 5 
Investigating whether a signal arising from another sensory modality can disambiguate 6 
bistable perception favouring the access to awareness of the interpretation of the visual 7 
stimulus congruent with the cross-modal stimulus is an interesting approach to studying 8 
multisensory awareness. However, as pointed out by Deroy et al. (2014), since the bistable 9 
perception of ambiguous figures is to some extent under attentional control (Gómez et al. 10 
1995; Horlitz & O’Leary 1993; Liebert & Burk 1985), it is difficult to disentangle the 11 
contribution of attention in mediating the effect of cross-modal stimulation on ambiguous 12 
figure perception. In fact, the interaction between bistable perception and tactile (visuo-tactile 13 
kinetic depth effect, Blake et al. 2004 and visuo-tactile Necker cube, Bruno et al. 2007),  14 
auditory (Robin's face/vase illusion with faces and voice uttering a syllable, Munhall et al. 15 
2009) and olfactory (ambiguous motion direction associate with a particular smell, Kuang & 16 
Zhang 2014) stimuli depends on awareness of the congruent interpretation of the visual 17 
stimulus, namely, cross-modal stimulation only interacts with the representation of the 18 
stimulus dominating observer’s perception, prolonging its duration.  19 
Binocular Rivalry 20 
A special case of perceptual bistability is binocular rivalry (Levelt 1965), that is caused by a 21 
conflict between monocular images rather than between different interpretations of the same 22 
monocular image. In a binocular rivalry display, incompatible images are contemporaneously 23 
presented to each eye (Fig. 1A), in this condition the two monocular images do not fuse into a 24 
coherent percept, but engage a strong competition for visual awareness that, in a “winner-25 
15 
 
takes-all” dynamic, leads to perceptual oscillations between the two images: observer’s 1 
perception is dominated by the stimulus presented to one eye for a few seconds until a 2 
perceptual switch occurs in favour the previously suppressed image (Fig. 1B). Importantly, 3 
during binocular rivalry, the suppressed visual stimulus is rendered invisible by the dominant 4 
one despite its presence on the retina. Compared to other forms of bistable perception, 5 
binocular rivalry is thought to be more automatic and stimulus-driven, ambiguous figures 6 
being more likely to be controlled by cognitive factors such as voluntary control or attention 7 
(Meng & Tong 2004). Importantly, voluntary attentional control over binocular rivalry is 8 
limited to dominance of the attended visual stimulus as the observer cannot voluntarily 9 
provoke a switch but only hold the dominant stimulus for a longer time (for a review on 10 
attention and binocular rivalry see Paffen & Alais, 2011). Even though experimental evidence 11 
shows that visual stimuli rendered invisible can exogenously capture attention and provide a 12 
cue for different kinds of visual tasks (Astle et al. 2010; Hsieh & Colas 2012; Hsieh et al. 13 
2011; Lamy et al. 2015; Zhang & Fang 2012), it is more difficult to voluntarily select the 14 
suppressed visual stimulus during binocular rivalry. In this vein, if cross-modal stimulation 15 
influences the dynamics of binocular rivalry only by prolonging dominance durations of the 16 
congruent visual stimulus (Fig. 1C reports an example of visuo-haptic interactions during 17 
binocular rivalry), the effect could in principle be mediated by a cross-modal shift of 18 
attention or a higher-level cognitive decision. If, on the other hand, cross-modal stimulation 19 
shortens the suppression of the congruent visual stimulus (provoking a switch when the 20 
visual and cross-modal stimulus are incongruent, Fig. 1D), promoting the access to awareness 21 
of the suppressed visual stimulus, the effect is likely to reflect a genuine case of multisensory 22 
awareness. It has been argued (Deroy et al. 2014) that the cross-modal modulation of visual 23 
awareness does not represent multisensory awareness, but only a case of multisensory 24 
interaction on the basis that this experimental approach studies awareness in a unisensory 25 
16 
 
framework (for example the access to visual awareness) and not the establishment of 1 
multisensory awareness from different sensory modalities information (Deroy et al. 2014). 2 
However, in this case, the observer is not aware of a visual stimulus on its own, and 3 
awareness is built by integrating signals from different modalities and therefore we may 4 
potentially be able to consider it a case of multisensory awareness.  5 
Figure 1 here 6 
Several studies have reported multisensory effects on binocular rivalry depending on 7 
awareness, and therefore possibly mediated by attention: dominance durations of the 8 
congruent visual stimulus are prolonged by auditory (Conrad et al. 2010; Guzman-Martinez 9 
et al. 2012; Kang & Blake 2005; Lee et al. 2015) and nostril-specific olfactory stimulation  10 
(Zhou et al. 2010) and by imitation of a grasping movement rivalling against a checkerboard 11 
(Di Pace & Saracini 2014). A strict link between cross-modal attention and binocular rivalry 12 
has been demonstrated by a study showing that cross-modal stimulation enhances people’s 13 
attentional control over binocular rivalry (van Ee et al. 2009). In this study, observers were 14 
asked to attend selectively to one of the rivalrous visual stimuli (which prolonged dominance 15 
durations of the attended stimulus compared to passive viewing), if either a sound or a 16 
vibration congruent with the attended visual stimulus was delivered simultaneously, 17 
dominance durations of the attended visual stimulus increased compared to the visual-only 18 
condition (van Ee et al. 2009). This result has recently been replicated using auditory and 19 
visual speech stimuli (Vidal & Barrès 2014): The latter researchers have shown that auditory 20 
syllables increase voluntary control over the rivalrous image of lips uttering the congruent 21 
syllable.    22 
What about cross-modal stimuli interacting with the suppression of the congruent visual 23 
stimulus? Numerous experiments have demonstrated that haptic and auditory stimulation 24 
17 
 
interact with binocular rivalry by rescuing the congruent visual stimulus from binocular 1 
suppression (Conrad et al. 2010; Lunghi et al. 2010). In a first study, Lunghi et al. (2010), 2 
demonstrated that, during binocular rivalry between orthogonally oriented visual gratings, 3 
active exploration of a haptic grating, promoted dominance of the rivalrous visual grating 4 
congruent in orientation both by prolonging its dominance durations (delaying the time of a 5 
perceptual switch during congruent visuo-haptic stimulation) and by shortening its 6 
suppression (hastening the time of a perceptual switch during incongruent visuo-haptic 7 
stimulation) as compared to visual-only stimulation (Lunghi et al. 2010). The effect of haptic 8 
stimulation on the suppressed visual stimulus has been shown to depend critically on the 9 
match between visuo-haptic spatial frequencies (Lunghi et al. 2010) and orientations (Lunghi 10 
& Alais 2013) and on the collocation of the haptic and visual stimuli (Lunghi & Morrone 11 
2013), indicating that the visual and haptic stimuli have to be perceived as being part of the 12 
same object and not simply cognitively associated. Moreover, a binocular rivalry experiment 13 
investigating suppression depth (the difference between contrast detection thresholds 14 
measured during dominance and suppression phases of binocular rivalry) during haptic 15 
stimulation (Lunghi & Alais 2015) has shown that haptic stimulation influences the dynamics 16 
of binocular rivalry mainly by preventing the congruent visual stimulus from becoming 17 
deeply suppressed (Lunghi & Alais 2015). This study clarifies a possible confound: during 18 
binocular rivalry, the monocular signals mutually inhibit each other, thus, in principle, touch 19 
could shorten suppression of the congruent visual stimulus both by interacting with it or 20 
potentially by interfering with the incongruent dominant stimulus, reducing its strength. By 21 
demonstrating that congruent touch improves contrast detection thresholds during 22 
suppression and incongruent touch does not have a masking effect on contrast detection 23 
thresholds during dominance (i.e., contrast discrimination thresholds are no higher during 24 
18 
 
incongruent touch), Lunghi & Alais (2015) have demonstrated that cross-modal stimulation 1 
during binocular rivalry actually boosts the suppressed visual signal. 2 
Similar effects on the suppressed visual stimulus have been reported for voluntary action 3 
(voluntarily controlling the motion direction of one of the rivalring stimuli by an active 4 
movement of the arm shortens its suppression, Maruya et al. 2007), simple and naturalistic 5 
motion sounds (Blake et al. 2004; Conrad et al. 2010; Conrad et al. 2013), olfaction 6 
(suppression duration of either the picture of a marker or a rose is reduced when a congruent 7 
odorant is smelled, Zhou et al., 2010), ecologically relevant sounds (hearing a bird singing 8 
reduces suppression of the picture of a bird, Chen et al. 2011) and temporal events (auditory 9 
and tactile temporal events combine to synchronize binocular rivalry between visual stimuli 10 
differing in temporal frequency, Lunghi et al. 2014).  11 
 12 
Continuous Flash Suppression 13 
In order to selectively study the effect of cross-modal stimulation on visual stimuli 14 
undergoing interocular suppression the method of continuous flash suppression (CFS) can be 15 
used, for it allows deep and constant suppression of a salient visual stimulus over extended 16 
periods of time (Tsuchiya & Koch 2005). When one eye is continuously flashed with 17 
different, contour-rich, high-contrast random patterns (e.g. white noise, Mondrian patterns, 18 
scrambled images) at about 10 Hz, information presented to the other eye is perceptually 19 
suppressed for extended periods of time (up to 3 minutes or more). Suppression provoked by 20 
continuous flashes has been shown to summate, resulting not only in longer suppression 21 
periods, but also in deeper suppression of the other eye: detection thresholds of probes 22 
presented to the suppressed eye during CFS are in fact elevated of a 20-fold factor compared 23 
to monocular viewing, compared with a 3-fold elevation observed during binocular rivalry 24 
19 
 
(Tsuchiya et al. 2006). Importantly, in binocular rivalry perception continuously alternates 1 
between the monocular images leading to some cognitive awareness about the suppressed 2 
stimulus, for it was the dominant one before the perceptual switch. By contrast, during CFS 3 
the coherent stimulus is deeply suppressed the flashing masks, so the observer is totally 4 
unaware of the suppressed visual stimulus, not only at the perceptual (the stimulus is 5 
invisible), but also at the cognitive level (no information about the suppressed visual stimulus 6 
is available to the observer either from memory or predictions). If a visual stimulus were 7 
released from CFS by a congruent cross-modal stimulus gaining access to visual awareness it 8 
would provide a case of multisensory awareness, or at least of awareness that has been 9 
induced multisensorially. 10 
Recent evidence has described cross-modal influences on CFS. Alsius & Munhall (2013) 11 
have shown that the movie of lips uttering a sentence made invisible by CFS is rescued from 12 
suppression earlier if observers listen to a voice speaking the sentence uttered by the movie as 13 
compared to an incongruent sentence. Salomon et al. (2013) have reported a similar result for 14 
proprioceptive signals, demonstrating that the image of a hand (perceptually projected on the 15 
observer’s real hand) is suppressed for a shorter time during CFS if it matches the position of 16 
the observer’s own hand as compared to an incongruent position (Salomon et al. 2013). A 17 
recent study from the same group (Salomon et al. 2015) has also shown a facilitation for 18 
congruent versus incongruent visuo-vestibular stimulation during CFS (Salomon et al. 2015). 19 
Finally, auditory facilitation of suppressed visual stimuli has been shown to depend on spatial 20 
collocation between the cross-modal stimuli both along the azimuth (Aller et al. 2015) and 21 




Taken together, the results reviewed here suggest that binocular rivalry and CFS are two 1 
promising techniques for characterizing multisensory awareness: first, suppressed visual 2 
stimuli are boosted into visual awareness via very specific mechanisms that rely on classical 3 
multisensory congruency cues that indicate whether sensory signals are caused by a common 4 
event; second binocular rivalry suppression and continuous flash suppression are 5 
impenetrable to voluntary attention (indicating a genuine multisensory effect is unlikely 6 
mediated by cross-modally driven attentional shifts); third a variety of sensory signals 7 
contribute to the multisensory enhancement of awareness (audition, touch, proprioception, 8 
voluntary action, olfaction, and the vestibular system), indicating a real supramodal 9 
mechanism mediating and consolidating awareness. Interestingly, a recent study (Di Luca et 10 
al. 2010) has shown that observers can learn to use invisible information (for example a 11 
vertical disparity gradient masked by other visual stimuli) to disambiguate visual perception 12 
in a bistable display (Di Luca et al. 2010), this suggests that similar learning paradigms using 13 
subliminal cross-modal stimuli in combination with either binocular rivalry or CFS could be 14 
used in the future to study cross-modal awareness. 15 
 16 
 17 
Concluding remarks  18 
Our discussion has highlighted substantial advances in our understanding of multisensory 19 
awareness over the past decade. Nevertheless, research into the relationship between 20 
multisensory integration and perceptual awareness faces a couple of unresolved challenges: 21 
First, it is controversially debated which perceptual experiences are necessarily associated 22 
with multisensory awareness. In the face of uncertainty concerning the underlying causal 23 
structure of the world the brain does often not integrate sensory signals into one unified 24 
21 
 
multisensory percept. For instance, in the spatial ventriloquist illusion participants tend to 1 
report different locations for the visual and the auditory signal sources with the perceived 2 
sound location being shifted towards the visual signal and the visual location towards the 3 
auditory signal depending on the relative reliabilities (Körding et al. 2007; Rohe & Noppeney 4 
2015, 2016).  5 
Can a sound percept that is influenced by a visual signal be considered an example of 6 
multisensory awareness? Further, when participants report both, the perceived sound and the 7 
perceived visual location, are they concurrently aware of both signals or do they rapidly 8 
switch their attention and awareness to perceptual and memory representations from different 9 
sensory modalities? Finally, in cases where participants are thought to integrate sensory 10 
signals into one unified percept and report identical locations for both sensory signals, does 11 
this guarantee the emergence of integrated multisensory awareness or are participants simply 12 
not able to dissociate between the two sorts of unisensory awareness in their report? In the 13 
light of these puzzling questions, it is interesting to note that participants were not able to 14 
perceive and report the motion direction both in vision and touch when being presented 15 
concurrently with a bistable motion quartet in the visual and tactile modalities (Conrad et al., 16 
2012). Thus, at least in situations where perception in the individual sensory modalities 17 
requires sustained temporal perceptual binding (such as in the case of apparent motion), 18 
multisensory awareness may not necessarily emerge, instead in these instances awareness 19 
switches between sensory modalities such as vision and touch. 20 
Second, numerous studies in anaesthetized animals have demonstrated that multisensory 21 
interactions can emerge in the absence of awareness (Stein & Meredith 1993). Yet, their 22 
relevance for conscious perception remains to be determined. While accumulating evidence 23 
suggests that aware signals can boost unaware signals into awareness, little is known about 24 
whether the reverse is also true. Can unaware signals in one sensory modality influence 25 
22 
 
perception in another sensory modality? Experiments focusing on the latter are more 1 
informative, because the former could simply be explained by non-specific top-down effects. 2 
Moreover, experiments may subliminally present signals in two sensory modalities that can 3 
be integrated into a unified percept to show that the subliminally integrated estimate 4 
influences subsequent conscious perception. 5 
Third, research into perceptual awareness in unisensory contexts has recently re-focused on 6 
classical metacognitive questions and asked to which extent participants can recognize their 7 
perceptual performance and abilities. This is an exciting as yet little explored avenue that 8 
would provide further insights into the emergence of multisensory integration, perception and 9 
awareness.  10 
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Figure 1. Diagram of a binocular rivalry display and possible effects of cross-modal 3 
stimulation on rivalrous visual perception. (A) An example of dichoptic stimulation in 4 
which orthogonal gratings are separately presented to the eyes, the resulting conscious 5 
perception (B) is dominated by one of the two monocular images until a perceptual switch 6 
occurs in favour of the other visual stimulus. Normally dominance duration of the rivalrous 7 
stimuli is balanced. (C) Example of cross-modal stimulation prolonging dominance of the 8 
congruent visual stimulus during binocular rivalry: if the observer touches a haptic grating 9 
parallel to the visual grating dominating rivalrous perception, the switch towards the 10 
orthogonal (incongruent) visual grating is delayed as compared to visual-only stimulation. 11 
(D) Example of cross-modal stimulation shortening the suppression of the congruent visual 12 
stimulus during binocular rivalry: if the observer touches a haptic grating orthogonal to the 13 
visual grating dominating rivalrous perception, the switch towards the parallel (congruent) 14 
visual grating occurs earlier compared to visual-only stimulation. 15 
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